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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a bench trial, the district court convicted Juan Santos-Quintero, Jr., of multiple
felonies relating to an incident where a law enforcement officer was shot.

On appeal,

Mr. Santos-Quintero asserts the district court abused its discretion when it admitted a detective's
testimony describing statements of an unavailable witness, because the court applied a wrong
standard to determine whether the statements should be admitted.

Idaho Rule of Evidence

804(b )(3)(B) requires that statements against criminal interest from an unavailable declarant in a
criminal case be supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate their
trustworthiness. However, the district court did not identify any corroborating circumstances
supporting the statements, and erroneously determined that requirement did not apply.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At Mr. Santos-Quintero' s bench trial, Lamon Gentillon testified that he reported to law
enforcement that someone had been shooting a gun from the driver's side window of a car, in the
Wolverine Road area near Firth. (See Tr., p.36, L.12 - p.38, L.19.) 1 He followed the car to a
house in Firth. (See Tr., p.40, L.5 - p.42, L.4.) The man driving the car went into the house, and
later a woman got out of the car. (See Tr., p.42, L.19 - p.43, L.12.) Mr. Gentillon identified the
driver of the car as Mr. Santos-Quintero. (See Tr., p.43, L.14-p.44, L.23.)
Sergeant Howell, Deputy Van Orden, and Deputy Katseanes of the Bingham County
Sheriffs Office responded to a priority call of shots fired, and arrived at the house in Firth. (See
Tr., p.52, L.8 - p.53, L.25, p.92, L.16 - p.94, L.2, p.142, L.3 - p.143, L.23.) Sergeant Howell

1

All citations to "Tr." refer to the transcript of the bench trial, conducted on April 23 and
April 24, 2019.
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received information that "Denise," wanted for questioning in connection to robberies in Idaho
Falls, and "Juan," were possibly in the house. (See Tr., p.56, Ls.12-18, p.57, L.19 - p.58, L.20.)
A few days before, Joshua Fuhriman had reported that his Ruger 9E gun and other items were
stolen from his car in the Ammon Walmart parking lot. (See Tr., p.29, L.18 -p.31, L.3.)
Bonneville County Sheriffs Office Detective Hammer testified that he investigated the
theft at the Walmart.

(See Tr., p.354, L.22 - p.355, L.20.)

Officers found items from

Mr. Fuhriman's car in an abandoned SUV, which matched the appearance of an SUV videotaped
near Mr. Fuhriman's car in the Walmart parking lot.

(See Tr., p.356, L.22 - p.360, L. 1.)

Detective Hammer testified that Mr. Santos-Quintero became part of the investigation after
people reported that one Denise Williams got out of the SUV during a drug deal, and
Ms. Williams was dating "Mono" or Mr. Santos-Quintero. (See Tr., p.361, L.18- p.362, L.14.)
At the house in Firth, Deputy Katseanes used his PA system to tell the people in the
house to come out with their hands up. (See Tr., p.59, Ls.2-20.) He testified that he spoke with
the homeowner, who thought his girlfriend's daughter was inside of his house, but was not sure
about anyone else. (See Tr., p.145, Ls.9-19.) The homeowner testified that law enforcement had
arrived at his house because a couple of individuals, including Ms. Williams, had supposedly
come into the house.

(See Tr., p.215, L.25 - p.216, L.13.)

The homeowner's girlfriend,

Ms. Williams' mother, testified that law enforcement showed up at the house because
Ms. Williams and Mr. Santos-Quintero were there. (See Tr., p.226, Ls.6-13.) However, they
had only seen Ms. Williams enter. (See Tr., p.216, Ls.14-17, p.221, L.20 - p.222, L.5, p.227,
Ls.15-18.)
Some time after Deputy Katseanes made his PA announcements, Ms. Williams left the
house. (See Tr., p.61, Ls.8-15, p.147, Ls.1-4.) The deputy testified that she told him nobody else
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was in the house, and the man she had been with, "Junior Sanchez," had become scared and ran
out the back. (See Tr., p.147, Ls.6-16.) Deputy Katseanes testified that he thought Ms. Williams
was covering up for whoever was still in the house, and he announced over the PA that they
knew Mr. Santos-Quintero was still inside. (See Tr., p.149, L.21 -p.150, L.9.)
The officers called the STAR team (the local equivalent to a SWAT team) to the scene.
(See Tr., p.152, Ls.10-18.) Meanwhile, Deputy Van Orden went to the back of the house, to

watch the back door.

(See Tr., p.63, Ls.5-14, p.99, Ls.7-12.)

He testified that, after

Ms. Williams left the house, he saw someone peek out from the back door. (See Tr., p.105, L.3 p.106, L.10.) Deputy Van Orden moved towards the door and yelled several times to have the
figure come out with hands up. (See Tr., p.106, L.15 - p.107, L. 7.)
Sergeant Howell testified that, when he ran to the back of the house after hearing
Deputy Van Orden yelling, he was shot from the open door. (See Tr., p.63, L.11 - p.65, L.25.)
Deputy Van Orden testified that he heard the shots and saw puffs of smoke from the open back
door. (See Tr., p.107, L.12 - p.108, L.6.) He testified that he returned fire, and heard Sergeant
Howell grunt. (See Tr., p.113, L.11 - p.114, L.16.) Deputy Van Orden moved Sergeant Howell
away from the back of the house. (See Tr., p.67, L.22-p.68, L.6, p.117, L.14-p.118, L.12.)
Sergeant Howell had a gunshot wound to his abdomen, and the bullet went through the
L3 vertebra in his spine. (See Tr., p.397, L.4 - p.400, L.9.) At the bench trial, Sergeant Howell
testified that he had high blood pressure from the bullet striking his left kidney, a chip in his
spine, and daily pain. (See Tr., p.81, Ls.17-25.) He testified that the bullet came from a 9mm
firearm. (See Tr., p.77, Ls.2-13.)
Deputy Van Orden testified that, after he returned to the back of the house, another series
of gunshots came from the house. (See Tr., p.119, Ls.17-23.) Additional law enforcement
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officers arrived at the house, including negotiators.

(See Tr., p.119, L.24 - p.121, L.12.)

Lieutenant Foster of the Bonneville County Sheriffs Office testified that he communicated with
the suspect using Detective Sergeant Noah's cell phone, in an attempt to get the suspect to
surrender. (See Tr., p.314, L.12 - p.315, L.14.) Lieutenant Foster testified that Mr. SantosQuintero was at first unwilling to surrender, because he was afraid they would shoot him since
he shot a police officer. (See Tr., p.315, Ls.15-20.) The lieutenant testified that the officers
referred to Mr. Santos-Quintero as "Junior" during the phone conversations. (See Tr., p.318,
Ls.3-16.) Detective Sergeant Noah testified that "Junior" mentioned he had shot an officer
several times throughout the negotiations. (See Tr., p.342, Ls.3-23.) Lieutenant Foster testified
that Mr. Santos-Quintero requested to speak with Ms. Williams, and mentioned he had a gun that
he had tossed in the kitchen. (See Tr., p.321, Ls.4-24.)
Mr. Santos-Quintero's stepfather testified that he received a phone call from Mr. SantosQuintero on the day of the incident, and a detective later interviewed him about the call. (See
Tr., p.385, L.17 - p.386, L.12.) The stepfather testified that Mr. Santos-Quintero said he was
afraid they were going to kill him.

(See Tr., p.387, Ls.4-11.) According to the stepfather,

Mr. Santos-Quintero admitted that he might have shot a cop. (See Tr., p.392, Ls.3-5.)
The negotiations were ultimately successful, and the suspect agreed to surrender. (See
Tr., p.168, Ls.10-14.) When Mr. Santos-Quintero came out of the back door, Deputy Katseanes
tackled him, handcuffed him, and turned him over to the negotiators. (See Tr., p.168, L.23 p.169, L.24.) Afterwards, an officer cleared the crawlspace in the house, and did not find anyone
there. (See Tr., p.282, L.12 - p.284, L.3.) In the kitchen of the house, officers found a Ruger
9mm pistol and empty 9mm shell casings. (See Tr., p.126, L.25 - p.127, L.10, p.171, L.25 -
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p.172, L.20, p368, Ls.11-20.) Britany Wylie, a forensic scientist with the Idaho State Police,
testified that the pistol shot the bullet that hit Sergeant Howell. (See Tr., p.415, Ls.10-13.)
Detective Tuttle with the Idaho State Police testified that officers determined Mr. SantosQuintero had used the Ruger pistol, because he was the only other person in the house and the
bullet retrieved from Sergeant Howell matched the gun. (See Tr., p.368, L.23 - p.369, L.5.)
However, Detective Tuttle testified on cross-examination that he did not know if any fingerprint
analysis had been done on the gun. (See Tr., p.375, Ls.12-16.) Deputy Kastemes testified on
cross-examination that he did not know if any gun-residue testing or other testing had been done
on Mr. Santos-Quintero to determine ifhe had fired a gun. (See Tr., p.185, Ls.11-17.) On crossexamination, Sergeant Detective Noah testified that no residue swab had been done to determine
if Mr. Santos-Quintero had fired a weapon. (See Tr., p.349, Ls.9-19.)
The State charged Mr. Santos-Quintero with felony aggravated battery upon certain
personnel (peace officer); two counts of aggravated assault upon certain personnel (peace
officer); unlawful possession of a firearm; and grand theft by receiving/possessing stolen
property. (R., pp.52-54.) The State also charged him with use of a firearm or deadly weapon
during the commission of a crime and persistent violator sentencing enhancements. (R., pp.5558.) Mr. Santos-Quintero entered a not guilty plea to the charges. (R., pp. 76-79.)
Mr. Santos-Quintero waived his right to trial by jury and elected to have a bench trial.
(R., p.211.) At the bench trial, the State called Ms. Williams, who had use immunity providing
that her testimony could not be used against her in her pending Bonneville County cases. (See
Tr., p.232, L.11 - p.235, L.17.) She was under a subpoena from the State. (See Tr., p.325,
Ls.23-25.) However, she stated "on record that I am not testifying." (Tr., p.236, Ls.1-3.) She
understood that, if she refused the district court's order to testify, she would be held in contempt
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of court.

(Tr., p.236, Ls.4-10.)

Despite the court's orders to have her testify and answer,

Ms. Williams refused to answer the thirteen questions posed by the State. (See Tr., p.236, L.15 p.243, L. 18.) On Ms. Williams' unavailability, the district court determined, "given her refusal
to answer the questions and the Court having ordered those answers, that witness is unavailable"
under Idaho Rule ofEvidence 804. (See Tr., p.244, Ls.10-21.)
In lieu of Ms. Williams' testimony, the State called Detective Medrano from the
Bonneville County Sheriffs Office to the stand. (See Tr., p.244, L.23 - p.245, L.22.) Detective
Medrano testified that she had interviewed Ms. Williams three times. (See Tr., p.246, L.11 p.247, L.19.) The State asked Detective Medrano about what Ms. Williams had said with respect
to being at her mother's house on the day of the incident, and Mr. Santos-Quintero objected
based on hearsay. (See Tr., p.247, L.24 - p.248, L.7.) The State argued, "this fits within the rule
of an unavailable witness." (Tr., p.248, Ls.9-10.)
The district court decided it would hear Detective Medrano' s testimony, to determine
whether the testimony fit the hearsay exceptions for statements of an unavailable witness under
Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b )(3 ), covering statements against interest, or Rule 804(b)( 6), the
catchall exception. (See Tr., p.248, L.25 - p.249, L.5, p.252, Ls.15-18.) The court stated: "And
then, ifl determine that it's admissible under those, then the Court would consider it. If it's not
admissible, then the Court would not consider that in its decision." (Tr., p.252, Ls.19-22.) The
State contended, "under [Rule 804(b )](3) she has ongoing cases, which is a statement against
interest." (Tr., p.252, Ls.23-25.)
Detective Medrano then answered the State's questions as follows:
Q. Detective, around September 21st of 2018, when you interviewed
Ms. Williams, did she mention anything about her being with Juan SantosQuintero at [her] mother's house?
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A. She did.
Q. And what was that?
A. She said that they got there. Prior, they had been up in Wolverine Canyon.
And they drove down, and there was a-they had pulled off to the side and had
done some target-practicing.
And then a guy was following them, and that's why they went to her
mother's house.
Q. Okay. When they were target-practicing, did she say who was shooting a gun?
A. She said that Juan was the one that shot the gun.
Q. Did she say anything about how long they were target-practicing for?
A. She said he fired three shots.

Q. Not to sound redundant, did [s]he ever say specifically that she saw Juan with
a firearm?
A. She said she did not.
was shooting.

She didn't like guns, so she was smoking while he

Q. Did she talk about where the firearm came from?
A. I asked her about where the-the firearm came from, yeah.
Q. And what was her response?
A. We had had a firearm stolen in-at the Walmart parking lot in Idaho Falls in
Bonneville County. And so I asked her if she was there with him.
Initially, she wouldn't admit to it. But she did say, yeah, that we would
see her on video in the vehicle in that parking lot and that he did go to a vehicle.
But she said she didn't know what he took.

Q. And that was at the Ammon Walmart?
A. Yes.
Q. Did she mention about-anything about anybody else being with them in
the car?
A. I don't believe so.
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Q. It was just the two of them?
A. As far as-yeah, I believe so.

Q. Did she refer to Juan Santos-Quintero as any other name?
A. "Mono" is what she would call him.

Q. Did she ever clarify that that was Juan Santos-Quintero?
A. Yes, she did.

(Tr., p.254, L.11 - p.256, L.9.)

On cross-examination, Detective Medrano testified that

Ms. Williams did not say that she took the firearm. (See Tr., p.256, Ls.19-22.)
On statements against interest under Rule 804(b)(3), the State argued Ms. Williams'
statements were supported by corroborating circumstances that indicated their trustworthiness, as
required by Rule 804(b)(3)(B). (See Tr., p.258, L.22 - p.259, L.18.) Additionally, the State
contended the statements were admissible under Rule 804(b)(6). (See Tr., p.259, L.19 - p.261,
L.19.)

Mr. Santos-Quintero asserted the corroborating circumstances provision of Rule

804(b )(3)(B) was not applicable, because Ms. Williams was not "offering some kind of
corroborating evidence." (See Tr., p.261, L.24 - p.262, L.16.) He also asserted there were no
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, as required by Rule 804(b )(6). (See Tr., p.263,
L.19 - p.264, L.5.) Further, the evidence did not add anything to the grand theft charge. (See
Tr., p.265, Ls.2-20.)
The district court's understanding of the evidence was that Ms. Williams "corroborates
that she was at Wolverine with the defendant; that somebody was following them; that they went
to her mother's home." (See Tr., p.270, Ls.7-10.) The court stated: "And the main thing that I
take from this is that she's identifying the defendant by name. And then you also have that one
element as to the 'knowing that the property was stolen' issue. So those are the two material
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facts that I think come out through this testimony that may be relevant." (Tr., p.270, Ls.11-16.)
The district court determined, "So I think that testimony goes to identity as to all counts and it
goes to the issue of whether ... the handgun was stolen or not and the reasonable belief that one
would have that it was-or circumstances that a person would know that it was stolen."
(Tr., p.270, Ls.18-22.) The court then stated it would reserve ruling on Detective Medrano's
testimony until it heard the other evidence. (Tr., p.272, Ls.1-8.)
Right before the State rested, the district court determined, "Having reviewed the
testimony of the detective, the unavailability of Denise Williams under 804, the Court does fmd
that she was unavailable and that the exception under (b )(3) applies." (Tr., p.422, Ls.8-11.) Per
the court, "Under (b )(3)(A), I note that the requirements under (b )-under 3(A) are in the
disjunctive." (Tr., p.422, Ls.12-13.) The district court then determined, "the statement that
Ms. Williams made to the detective is a statement that a reasonable person in the declarant's
position would have made only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it tended
to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability."

(Tr., p.422, Ls.14-18.)

The court

continued: "In this case, the statements that she issued could expose her to criminal liability.
And, therefore, the Court fmds that exception to apply. So the Court will consider the testimony
ofDetective Medrano .... " (Tr., p.422, Ls.19-23.)
The district court found Mr. Santos-Quintero guilty on all five counts, and also found that
he was a persistent violator. (See Tr., p.445, L.19 - p.460, L.25.) The court found Mr. SantosQuintero not guilty on the use of a deadly weapon sentencing enhancement, because no date had
been listed in Part II of the Information. (See Tr., p.461, L.1 - p.462, L.6.) The district court
imposed an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment, with twenty-seven years fixed.
R., pp.275-78.) Mr. Santos-Quintero filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.279-81.)
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(See

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted Detective Medrano' s testimony
describing Ms. Williams' statements, because the district court applied a wrong standard to
determine whether the statements should be admitted?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted Detective Medrano's Testimony
Describing Ms. Williams' Statements, Because The District Court Applied A Wrong Standard
To Determine Whether The Statements Should Be Admitted

A.

Introduction
Mr. Santos-Quintero asserts the district court abused its discretion when it admitted

Detective Medrano' s testimony describing Ms. Williams' statements, because the district court
applied a wrong standard to determine whether the statements should be admitted. Idaho Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(3)(B) requires that statements against criminal interest from an unavailable
declarant in a criminal case be supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate
their trustworthiness.

However, the district court did not identify any corroborating

circumstances supporting the statements, and erroneously determined that requirement did not
apply. Thus, the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. The
State will be unable to prove that the district court's abuse of discretion in admitting Detective
Medrano' s

testimony

describing

Ms.

Williams'

statements

ts

harmless

beyond

a

reasonable doubt.

B.

Standard Of Review
"When reviewing the trial court's evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse of

discretion standard."

State v. Anderson, 162 Idaho 610, 614 (2017).

An appellate court

reviewing an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court inquires into whether the trial court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
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available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

C.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards,
Because It Did Not Identify Any Corroborating Circumstances Supporting The
Statements, And Erroneously Determined That Requirement Did Not Apply
The district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards when it

admitted Detective Medrano' s testimony describing Ms. Williams' statements.

Rule

804(b )(3)(B) requires that statements against criminal interest from an unavailable declarant in a
criminal case be supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate their
trustworthiness.

Here, the district court did not identify any corroborating circumstances

supporting Ms. Williams' statements, and erroneously determined that requirement did
not apply.
The Idaho Rules of Evidence define "hearsay" as a statement that "the declarant does not
make while testifying at the current trial or hearing," and "a party offers in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted in the statement." I.RE. 801(c). 2 "Hearsay is not admissible except
as provided by these rules or other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Idaho."
I.R.E. 802.
There are exceptions to the rule against hearsay for situations when the declarant is
unavailable as a witness. I.RE. 804. As is relevant here, "A declarant is considered to be
unavailable as a witness if the declarant ... refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a
court order to do so." I.RE. 804(a)(2). A "statement against interest" is "not excluded by the
rule against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness," where the statement is one that
2

A "statement" is "a person's oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the
person intended it as an assertion," and a "declarant" is "the person who made the statement."
I.R.E. 801(a) & (b).
12

(A) a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made only if the
person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the
declarant' s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to
invalidate the declarant' s claim against someone else or to expose the declarant to
civil or criminal liability; and
(B) is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its
trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the
declarant to criminal liability.
I.R.E. 804(b)(3).
As the Idaho Supreme Court has held, "These corroborating circumstances are necessary
and must 'clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."' State v. Meister, 148 Idaho
236, 242 (2009) (quoting State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 16-17 (Ct. App. 1995)). The Court in
Meister observed that the "Arizona supreme court established seven factors for determining the

reliability and corroboration of a statement subjected to the hearsay exception established in
804(b)(3)." Id. (citing State v. LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563, 570 (1987)) (footnote omitted). The
Arizona Supreme Court in La Grand ''ultimately held that a judge's inquiry, made to assure
himself [or herself] that the corroboration requirement of Rule 804(b )(3) has been satisfied,
should be limited to asking whether evidence in the record corroborating and contradicting the
declarant' s statement would permit a reasonable person to believe that the statement could be
true."' Id. (quoting La Grand, 734 P .2d at 570) (alteration and emphasis in original). The Idaho
Supreme Court in Meister adopted "Arizona's standard and seven factor test for the
corroboration requirement pursuant to I.R.E. 804(b)(3)." Id.
The seven factors are: (1) whether the declarant is unavailable; (2) whether the statement
is against the declarant's interest; (3) whether corroborating circumstances exist which clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the exculpatory statement, taking into account contradictory
evidence, the relationship between the declarant and the defendant; (4) whether the declarant has
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issued the statement multiple times; (5) whether a significant amount of time has passed between
the incident and the statement; (6) whether the declarant will benefit from making the statement;
and (7) whether the psychological and physical surroundings could affect the statement. Id. at
242 n.7 (citing LaGrand, 734 P.2d at 569-70).
In Meister, a murder and conspiracy to commit murder case, the defendant attempted at
trial to admit evidence that another individual was the actual perpetrator of the crime, including
the other person's confessions.

See id. at 238-39.

The district court refused to admit the

alternate perpetrator evidence, based on the standard set in State v. Larsen, 91 Idaho 42 (1966),
requiring a defendant to produce a train of facts or circumstances that tended to clearly point out
someone besides the defendant as the guilty party. See Meister, 148 Idaho at 240 (quoting
Larsen, 91 Idaho at 47-48). On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the adoption of the

Idaho Rules of Evidence in 1985 implictly overruled Larsen. Id. The Meister Court held that
Rule 403 was the controlling authority for the admissibility of alternate perpetrator evidence.
See id. at 240-41. Because the district court did not address whether the alternate perpetrator

evidence was relevant and admissible pursuant to Rules 401, 402, and 403, the district court
abused its discretion by applying the wrong standard for admissibility of alternate perpetrator
evidence. See id. at 241. Thus, the Court granted the defendant a new trial. Id.
Regarding the other person's confessions, the Meister Court held that the district court's
application of Larsen was "incorrect because it was implicitly overruled by this Court's adoption
of the Idaho Rules of Evidence," and whether the confessions "should have been admitted is
dictated by I.R.E. 401, 402, 403 and 804(b)(3)." Id. The district court, when it determined the
defendant could not call the other person or witnesses who had heard the confessions, only cited
to Larsen as authority. See id. at 243. The Meister Court noted: "Although the district court
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applied the wrong standard to determine whether the statements were admissible, the district
court did make a finding that the evidence presented in the offer of proof did not sufficiently
corroborate the evidence. Therefore, the district court correctly found that some corroboration is
necessary in order for the statements to be admissible." Id. at 243. The Court held, "The district
court applied the wrong standard to determine whether [the other person's] confessions should
be excluded." Id.
In the instant case, the district court similarly applied a wrong standard to determine
whether Ms. Williams' statements should be admitted.

In admitting Detective Medrano' s

testimony describing the statements, the district court did not ensure that the corroboration
requirement of Rule 804(b)(3) had been satisfied.

The district court did not identify any

corroborating circumstances supporting Ms. Williams' statements that clearly indicated the
trustworthiness of the statements.

(See Tr., p.422, Ls.8-21.)

Rather, the district court

erroneously determined, "Under (b )(3)(A), I note that the requirements under (b )-under (3)(A)
are in the disjunctive." (Tr., p.422, Ls.12-13.) The district court then examined the statements
solely under Rule 804(b )(3)(A); "the statement that Ms. Williams made to the detective is a
statement that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made only if the person
believed it to be true, because, when made, it tended to expose the declarant to civil or criminal
liability." (Tr., p.422, Ls.14-18.) The district court determined that "the statements that she
issued could expose her to criminal liability," and therefore determined that Rule 804(b )(3)
applied and the court would consider Detective Medrano' s testimony describing Ms. Williams'
statements. (See Tr., p.422, Ls.19-23.)
However, Rule 804(b )(3) is not disjunctive in a criminal case where the statement is
against the declarant' s criminal interest, but conjunctive: both the against criminal interest
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requirement under subsection (A) and the corroboration requirement under subsection (B) must
be satisfied. I.R.E. 804(b )(3)(A) & (B). Put otherwise, the "corroborating circumstances are
necessary and must 'clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."' Meister, 148 Idaho
at 242 (quoting Priest, 128 Idaho at 16-17). Thus, because the district court here did not ensure
that the corroboration requirement was satisfied, the district court did not act consistently with
the applicable legal standards. The district court therefore abused its discretion when it admitted
Detective Medrano' s testimony describing Ms. Williams' statements, because the district court
applied a wrong standard to determine whether the statements should be admitted.

D.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Error Is Harmless
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows

that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). "To
hold an error as harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the
conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
Mr. Santos-Quintero asserts the State will simply be unable to show the district court's
error in admitting Detective Medrano' s testimony describing Ms. Williams' statements is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the district court's judgment of conviction should be
vacated, and the matter should be remanded to the district court for a new trial. See Meister, 148
Idaho at 241, 243.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Santos-Quintero respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the district court's judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for a
new trial.
DATED this 29 th day of July, 2020.
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